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Abstract 
The power sector has a central role in modern economies and other infrastructures 
rely heavily upon secure electricity supplies. Due to interdependencies, major 
electricity supply interruptions result in cascading effects in other sectors of the 
economy. This paper investigates the economic effects of large power supply 
disruptions taking such interdependencies into account. We apply a dynamic 
inoperability input–output model (DIIM) to 101 sectors (including the households) 
of the Scottish economy in 2009 in order to explore direct, indirect, and induced 
effects of electricity supply interruptions. We then estimate the societal cost of 
energy not supplied (SCENS) due to a power interruption, in the presence of 
interdependency among the sectors. The results show that the most economically 
affected industries, following an outage, can be different from the most inoperable 
ones. The results also indicate that SCENS varies with duration of a power cut, 
ranging from around £4,300/MWh for a one-minute outage to around £8,100/MWh 
for a three hour (and higher) interruption. The economic impact of estimates can be 
used to design policies for contingency measures and preventive investments in the 
power sector. 
 
Keywords: Power blackout, inoperability input–output model, 
interdependent economic systems, cost of energy not supplied 
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1. Introduction 
 
Modern economies are crucially and increasingly dependent on reliable energy services 
from the power sector. This dependence, to a large extent, stems from the reliance of 
other critical infrastructure (CI) sectors such as natural gas, water supplies, petroleum, 
telecommunications, and transportation, on power supplies. Meanwhile, critical 
infrastructures are also interdependent and interact with each other in numerous and 
sometimes complex ways.  
 
The interdependencies among the CIs are the main factor behind the unforeseen chains 
of events, or the ‘cascade effects’, in the event that a CI fails. This is particularly 
important in the case of failure in the power supply system, as this tends to propagate 
the ripple rapidly to other infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, the ripple effects of 
electricity supply shocks often reach beyond their first-order effects. This implies that 
the socio-economic cost of power outages can be larger when the cascading effects and 
interdependencies among infrastructure industries are taken into account (Kjølle et al., 
2012).  
 
Previous experience from exceptional events in the power sector has raised the concerns 
about the economic consequences of such failures.
2
 An important part of these costs is 
due to the indirect and induced effects due to sectoral interdependencies and the spilling 
over of power failures to other infrastructures.
3
 Despite its importance, the information 
available about the economic impact of large electricity supply interruptions remains 
limited (Linares and Rey, 2013). This is mainly because such interruptions are rare 
events and the data about them is thus scarce. An optimal response to these events 
                                                          
2
 For example, on 17 December 1978, almost the entire French electricity system failed (except in regions 
which were supplied by Germany) for around 2 hours and 15 minutes in the morning and resulted in a 
cost of more than US$1 billion in terms of lost production (Sanghvi, 1982). 
3
 An example is the major blackout in the US in August 2003. This event triggered several cascading 
effects, for example: traffic lights went off, computer systems were affected, trains and subways were 
disrupted, the banking and financial sectors were severely affected, health care was only able to work on 
emergency power (if available) or had to close, sporting events were cancelled, and schools closed (Min 
et al., 2007). 
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entails having better knowledge about their (economic) impact at sectoral and economy 
level. The insights into the effects would help to protect the critical infrastructures better 
in the event of major service disruptions and to minimize the economic and welfare 
consequences of cascading effects resulting from power failure.  
 
Moreover, risk-informed decisions will help the development of investment strategies 
and the adoption of measures to reduce the overall risk (Conard et al., 2006). Also, 
concerns such as how to design contingency plans to minimize the economic impact of 
power outages can be assessed when the most vulnerable sectors to interruptions are 
identified. Additionally, a related policy concern is the level of investments required to 
prevent major incidences in the power sector. An estimate of societal costs of major 
service interruptions is useful for planning and decision making as it can be used to 
calculate the amount that the society need to invest in order to avoid catastrophic events 
(given the probability of these events) (Pindyck and Wang, 2013).  
 
This paper investigates the interdependency effects and economic impact of power 
supply disturbance through a Dynamic Inoperability Input–output Model (DIIM) 
applied to 101 sectors of the Scottish economy in 2009. Additionally, we use the DIIM 
model to estimate the societal cost of energy not supplied (SCENS),
4
 taking into 
account the interdependencies among infrastructures.  
 
The following section describes the sectoral interdependencies and discusses some of 
the previous approaches used to estimating the cost of power outages. Section 3 puts 
forward the methodology adopted to assess the impact of electricity supply disruptions 
on interdependent sectors of the economy and to compute the value of energy not 
served. Section 4 presents the results of applying this method to the case of the Scottish 
economy and discusses some policy implications. Finally, Section 5 gives the 
concluding remarks.  
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 We use the term ‘societal’ because SCENS includes the cost to both the power sector and to the rest of 
the economy resulting from interruption. 
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2. Sectoral interdependency and power interruptions 
 
Better knowledge of the economic impact of electricity supply disruptions is important 
for regulators and policy makers, given the extensive interdependencies between the 
power sector and other infrastructure industries. These interdependencies generally fall 
into four categories: geographical, logical (also called procedural), cyber, and physical 
(Rinaldi et al., 2001; Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006). Geographical interdependency is 
related to locational proximity. Procedural interdependency is due to protocols such as a 
halt in operations due to a security threat. Cyber and physical interdependency reflect 
engineering reliance to inputs (in the form of data or physical materials) from other 
infrastructures. 
 
The physical and cyber interdependencies between the electricity sector and the rest of 
economy are highly susceptible to shock transmission. This stems from the central 
position of electricity in modern economies. For instance, all sectors of the economy use 
electricity directly as an input in the production process, or indirectly to support a 
production process. In turn, the power sector itself relies on inputs from other sectors. 
Therefore, the system of interdependent infrastructures is capable of transmitting power 
failures shocks that can cause unforeseen repercussions throughout the economy. 
Furthermore, with the increased use of information and communication technologies in 
the power industry, there is a strong element of informational reliance between the 
electricity system and other infrastructures, thus further increasing the intricacy of the 
interdependencies. 
 
Other forms of interdependencies can also be related to the power sector. For example, 
there is often some geographic proximity between the power grid infrastructure and 
telecommunication networks (such as telephone lines) or transport infrastructures (such 
as railways). Such proximity can influence the functionality of these infrastructures 
when an event causes damage to one of them. This suggests that reliable operation of 
the interdependent infrastructures is fundamental to preventing the costly consequences 
of cascading effects in the event of failure. Also, it underlines the role of regulation and 
policy in incentivizing resiliency enhancement in the critical infrastructures.  
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The cost of energy not supplied can be used by the sector regulator when incentivizing 
power quality and resiliency improvements. More accurate estimations of the societal 
cost of interruption allow policy makers to make better investment decisions in 
resiliency enhancement and contingencies. However, the complexity of modern 
economies makes this a challenging task. Moreover, there are significant differences in 
the estimated value of lost load among the current studies (see Table 1). This is partly 
related to the differences in the approaches taken and to the structures of economies 
investigated.  
 
Previous studies mainly revolve around two main approaches to estimate the cost of 
energy not supplied (although there are more potential approaches). Some studies use 
surveys to elicit consumers’ preferences based on their willingness to pay (WTP) for 
reliable services or willingness to accept (WTA) interruptions. The second approach is 
based on production functions which relate electricity consumption to the value of the 
output of firms, or the time spent on non-paid work in the case of households (Leahy 
and Tol, 2011). In this approach, the gross value added (GVA) of a sector is divided by 
the electricity used in the sector in order to estimate the output value of each unit of 
electricity supply. This figure is then used as an estimation of the loss of output for each 
unit of electricity not supplied. Table 1 summarizes selected previous studies on the cost 
of electricity interruptions using these two approaches.
5
  
 
There are, however, several issues with the above two approaches. Firstly, the 
implementation of comprehensive surveys that accurately reflect the preferences of all 
consumer categories is time consuming and costly. Secondly, there are issues with 
surveys, such as the possibility of poor measurement, omission of relevant cases, and 
non-response. The production function approach has also drawbacks. For example, the 
ratio of GVA to electricity consumption in a given sector, only reflects the average 
productivity of electricity in that sector. Thus the relationship of this with the true value 
of the interruption cost is slight as it only shows the value added from electricity under 
the normal production process; this does not necessarily hold during an interruption due 
to disequilibrium, interdependency, and associated effects. 
                                                          
5
 A detailed overview of the studies of interruption costs and their approaches is given in Toba (2007). 
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Table 1: Summary of selected studies of cost of power interruptions 
Study Country Year Method Estimated costs 
Adjusted costs 
(2009 prices) 
Leahy and Tol 
(2011) 
Ireland 2007 Production 
function 
Total €12.9/KWh €13.63 /KWh 
Balducci et al. 
(2002) 
USA 1996 Surveys Total $8.76/KW (1 h) €8.55/KW (1 h) 
Nooij et al. 
(2007) 
Netherlands 2001 Production 
function 
Total €8.56/KWh €10.27/KWh 
Diboma and 
Tatietse (2013) 
Cameroon 2009 Survey €3.62 to 5.42/KWh for 
a 1-h interruption and 
€1.96 to 2.46/kWh for 
a 4-h outage. 
€3.62 to 5.42/KWh 
for a 1-h 
interruption and  
€1.96 to 2.46/KWh 
for a 4-h outage. 
Reichl et al. 
(2013) 
Austria 2011 Production 
function 
and survey 
€17.1/ KWh €16.80/ KWh 
 
Furthermore, many earlier studies estimate the cost of power outage as a constant 
function in terms of $/KW or $/KWh without taking into account the time dependency 
of the outage cost (Lo et al., 1994). Additionally, perhaps the most serious shortcoming 
of the aforementioned approaches when estimating the societal cost of interruptions is 
that they do not allow for the interdependency effects among the infrastructure sectors. 
Interdependency can become more significant with increased duration of the 
interruption, because the higher order and induced effects can cause additional costs. 
Therefore, given the issues with the traditional approaches used in the previous 
literature, we use a dynamic inoperability input–output model. The method adopted in 
this study not only accounts for the sectoral interdependencies but also captures the time 
dependencies of interruption costs.  
 
Another important point, which is often overlooked, is the class of outages for which a 
specific type of method is suitable. Weather-related incidences – such as wind, 
lightning, snow, rain, ice, and dust events – are among the most important causes of 
power outages. Other factors can also affect network operational conditions – such as 
when animals, trees, vehicles, or flying objects come into contact with power lines, 
fuses, and other equipment – resulting in power faults and consequent blackouts. In 
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addition, equipment failure and surplus or insufficient demand can cause outages; the 
need for planned outages must also be taken into account. In recent years, with an 
increase in the share of renewable resources, the risk of power outage has increased due 
to both under and oversupply of energy from stochastic sources, such as wind and solar 
power. This is because supply variability can lead to grid instability as it affects 
frequency.  
 
However, none of the existing methods covers all types of power outages. The approach 
adopted in this study (DIIM model) is mainly suitable for the class of outages which is 
related to the networks, it thus covers a wide range of outage types. This is reasonable 
given that more than 90 per cent of power outage incidences are related to the grid 
(Hammond and Waldron, 2008). Furthermore, electricity distribution networks are often 
composed of hundreds of thousands of kilometres of overhead lines and underground 
cables which can be easily exposed to extreme weather conditions. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
As mentioned, we use a dynamic inoperability input–output model (DIIM) to assess the 
direct, indirect, and induced impacts of power supply interruptions on different sectors 
of the economy. Input–output models are effective tools for investigating the spread of 
failure and recovery in a system of interdependent infrastructures (Ward, 2010).  
 
DIIM has several advantages and features which makes it the method of choice for our 
type of analysis. First, unlike traditional approaches, DIIM takes a holistic view of the 
economy which also takes the interdependencies between the different sectors of the 
economy into account. Second, DIIM allows for intertemporal analysis; this has proved 
to be useful given that the cost of outages tend to change with duration of interruptions 
(most traditional methods do not have the capacity to capture the dynamic nature of 
power cuts). Finally, the DIIM enables us to distinguish between inoperability and the 
economic loss effect of power outages. 
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The inoperability input–output model (IIM), as a derivative of the Leontief model, was 
first introduced by Haimes and Jiang (2001) to model interdependent infrastructure 
sectors. It was later developed further by Santos and Haimes (2004) to quantify the 
impact of terrorism on critical infrastructures. Other studies using the IIM approach and 
its variations to investigate the behaviour of interdependent infrastructures include 
Haimes et al. (2005a; 2005b), Setola et al. (2009), Crowther and Haimes (2010), and 
Oliva et al. (2011). 
 
The simple form of a Leontief input–output model (see Leontief, 1936; Santos, 2006) 
can be written as in (1). 
𝑋 = 𝐴𝑋 + 𝐶                            (1) 
where 𝐶 denotes the demand vector, which is the amount of product that consumers 
consume. 𝑋 represents the total production which is required to satisfy the demand 
vector 𝐶. The technology coefficient matrix 𝐴 describes the relations among the sectors 
of the economy. Each column vector of the matrix represents a specific industry, while 
each corresponding row vector represents the amounts that each industry contributes as 
an input into the industry represented in each column.  
 
In a similar manner, the general form of the IIM model can be presented as in (2) 
(Santos and Haimes, 2004; Santos, 2006)
6
 
𝑞 = 𝐴∗𝑞 + 𝐶∗                           (2) 
where 𝑞 is an inoperability vector which is defined as the ratio of unrealized production 
to normal production
7
. 𝐴∗ is the interdependency matrix which presents the degree of 
correlation among different industry sectors. 𝐶∗ is the demand disturbance vector which 
is the ratio of demand reduction over the normal production level.  
 
                                                          
6
 See Haimes et al. (2005a) for a description and derivation of the IIM model from the Leontief equation. 
7
 An important point to consider is that inoperability in this study is defined for a sector and not for a 
single production unit (a sector is a set of many production units). A partial disruption to an input (for 
example, electricity) can make a sector partially inoperable because while some production units become 
fully inoperable many others are not affected by power disruption. However, for a single production unit 
lack of an input such as electricity can disrupt the whole production process irrespective of how much of 
other inputs are available. 
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Equation (3) thus represents the demand side perturbation where ?̂? and ?̃? are normal 
demand and reduced demand respectively, and ?̂? is planned production. The assumption 
of non-zero production values for each industry guarantees the existence of 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(?̂?) 
inverse, which is also a diagonal matrix. 
                                                 𝐶∗ = [𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(?̂?)]−1[?̂? − ?̃?]                           (3) 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑐1
∗
⋮
⋮
𝑐𝑖
∗
⋮
⋮
𝑐𝑛
∗]
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
?̂?1
0 … … 0
0 ⋱ ⋱ 0 ⋮
⋮ ⋱
1
?̂?𝑖
⋱ ⋮
⋮ 0 ⋱ ⋱ 0
0 … … 0
1
?̂?𝑛]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
?̂?1 − ?̃?1
⋮
?̂?𝑖 − ?̃?𝑖
⋮
?̂?𝑛 − ?̃?𝑛]
 
 
 
 
 
It is evident that we always have 0 ≤ 𝐶𝑖
∗ ≤
𝑐̂𝑖
?̂?𝑖
 where 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . , 𝑛}. The lower limit 
corresponds to the case that reduced demand is the same as normal demand, so there is 
no deviation from the steady state. However, when the reduced demand is zero, the 
deviation is maximized, equalling the upper limit of the aforementioned inequality. 
 
The interdependency matrix, 𝐴∗, is related to the Leontief technical coefficient matrix 𝐴, 
and vector of normal production of industries as in (4). 
                                            𝐴∗ = [𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(?̂?)]−1[𝐴] [𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(?̂?)]                               (4) 
If we substitute (4) and (3) into (2) we obtain (5): 
                                𝑞 = [𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(?̂?)]−1[𝐴] [𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(?̂?)]𝑞 + [𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(?̂?)]−1[?̂? − ?̃?]      (5) 
which presents the inoperability vector 𝑞 in terms of planned production, the Leontief 
technical coefficient matrix, normal demand, and disturbed demand. It can be shown 
that the inoperability vector 𝑞 is between zero and one (see Santos and Haimes, 2004). 
When 𝑞 is equal to zero, there is no disruption and production is ‘business-as-usual’. In 
the extreme case where 𝑞 is equal to one, the production process is completely 
disrupted.  
 
The IIM model can be extended to represent a dynamic inoperability input–output 
model (DIIM), by introducing the dynamic aspect of interdependent economic systems 
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and resiliency of the sectors, as in (6) and (7) (see Haimes et al., 2005a; Orsi and 
Santos, 2010). 
                                      𝑞(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑞(𝑡) + 𝐾[𝐴∗𝑞(𝑡) + 𝑐∗(𝑡) − 𝑞(𝑡)]                (6) 
where 𝐾 is a resiliency matrix and its elements show how the system responds to 
disequilibrium and 𝑡 is time period. The relation in (6) can be approximated with a 
differential equation as in (7). 
                                            ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝐾[𝐴∗𝑞(𝑡) + 𝑐∗(𝑡) − 𝑞(𝑡)]                             (7) 
As seen from equations (6) and (7), the inoperability in each period is equal to the 
inoperability in the previous period plus a partial adjustment of inoperability due to 
resiliency. The value of the resiliency matrix can be either negative or zero. Under the 
condition that resiliency is zero, the inoperability does not change over time and these 
equations will be the equivalent of the static IIM formula in (2). However, when the 
resiliency matrix is negative, it can be seen from (6) and (7) that inoperability will 
eventually decrease over time. The coefficients of the resiliency matrix depend on the 
characteristics of the industry and on the risk mitigation policies implemented. In other 
words, the resiliency of the sector can be controlled through risk mitigation measures 
such as redundancy, which consequently reduces the recovery time and financial losses 
following a disturbance. 
 
The general solution to the differential equation in (7) will be as in (8) (Haimes et al., 
2005a). 
                        𝑞(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝐾(𝐼−𝐴
∗)𝑡𝑞(0) + ∫ 𝐾𝑒−𝐾(𝐼−𝐴
∗)(𝑡−𝜉)𝑡
0
𝐶∗( 𝜉)𝑑𝜉                       (8) 
The assumption of stationarity of final demand, 𝑐∗, allows us to simplify (8) further as 
follows: 
                          𝑞(𝑡) = (𝐼 − 𝐴∗)−1𝑐∗ + 𝑒−𝐾(𝐼−𝐴
∗)𝑡[𝑞(0) − (𝐼 − 𝐴∗)−1𝑐∗]                 (9) 
                                            𝑞(𝑡) = 𝑞∞ + 𝑒
−𝐾(𝐼−𝐴∗)𝑡[𝑞(0) − 𝑞∞]                               (10) 
where 𝑞∞ is the steady state (equilibrium) level of inoperability determined by final 
demand 𝑐∗, and 𝑞(0) represents the initial inoperability imposed by the shock. As seen 
from (9) and (10), the term including 𝑒−𝐾(𝐼−𝐴
∗)𝑡 fades off over time and, in an infinite 
time horizon, these equations will converge to a static IIM.  
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A key feature of DIIM is the resiliency matrix coefficients, which show the response of 
individual industries to the imbalance between supply and demand. Under the 
conditions that 𝑘𝑖 > 0, 𝑎𝑖𝑗
∗ = 0 ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, and final demand remains constant, the 
following equation, based on (8), can be written: 
                                         𝑞𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑞𝑖(0)𝑒
−𝑘𝑖(1−𝑎𝑖𝑖
∗ )𝑡                          (11) 
which leads us to obtain elements of the resiliency matrix as in (12). 
                                           𝑘𝑖 =
ln [𝑞𝑖(0)/𝑞𝑖(𝑇)]
𝑇𝑖(1−𝑎𝑖𝑖
∗ )
                              (12) 
where 𝑞𝑖(0) is the magnitude of initial inoperability of sector 𝑖 imposed by the shock 
and 𝑇𝑖 is the time taken by the sector to arrive at the inoperability level of 𝑞𝑖(𝑇𝑖). 
Naturally, the final level of inoperability must be lower than the initial inoperability 
level to ensure a positive 𝑘𝑖 .
8
 Finally, 𝑎𝑖𝑖
∗  is the element of 𝐴∗ that can be obtained using 
its relationship with the Leontief coefficient matrix 𝐴. The underlying assumption is 
that the resiliency of the sector solely depends on itself and not on the other sectors. 
Thus, the resiliency matrix is diagonal.  
 
Under the input–output framework discussed above, the impact of a shock to any sector 
(e.g., the power sector) can be measured both in terms of inoperability (𝑞) and economic 
loss (𝑄). The cumulative economic loss, over period of recovery, for an individual 
sector and for the whole economy (𝑛 sectors) can be obtained from (13) and (14) 
respectively. 
𝑄𝑖(𝑡) = ?̂?𝑖 ∫ 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡=𝑇
𝑡=0
                                          (13) 
𝑄(𝑇) = ∑(?̂?𝑖 ∫ 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡=𝑇
𝑡=0
)
𝑛
𝑖=1
                              (14) 
The concept of inoperability in our model corresponds to the reliability concept in the 
power sector. In the electricity industry, system reliability is usually defined as 
                                                          
8
 Because the resiliency matrix already has a negative sign, as seen from Equation (8). 
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1 − 
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
. Using a similar analogy 
we can compute the cost of supply disruption using the inoperability metric and societal 
cost of power sector inoperability as previously presented in (14). Thus, if 𝐸 represents 
the total electrical energy that is normally delivered during each period, we can 
calculate the cost of a major supply disruption using relation (15): 
                                                 𝑆𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆 =
𝑄(𝑇)
𝐸 ∫ 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡=𝑇
𝑡=0
                             (15) 
where 𝑆𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆 is the socio-economic cost of energy not supplied and can be presented in 
terms of £/MWh or £/KWh. The term 𝐸 ∫ 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡=𝑇
𝑡=0
 shows the total electrical energy 
interrupted during the outage, as a result of an inoperability shock 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) to power sector.  
 
3.1 Household Sector 
Sectoral input–output data do not render information about the value of leisure for the 
household sector while electricity is important for many leisure activities. Therefore, we 
extend our analysis to include also the effect of outages on this crucial sector. Obtaining 
accurate estimations of the economic cost of power outages for the household sector is a 
challenging task. 
 
Valuation methods based on ‘stated preference’ are costly and can sometimes be 
misleading because it is hard to quantify the value of leisure by asking consumers about 
their willingness-to-pay for reliable service or willingness-to-accept an outage. 
Moreover, households’ valuation of leisure time can change over relatively short time 
periods. Approaches based upon ‘revealed preference’, where the actual choices of 
households are observed, can be a proxy for consumer willingness to pay for continuity 
of supply (e.g., the amount invested by a household in backup generation to compensate 
for poor supply reliability). However, despite the appealing characteristics of this 
method, the problem of data availability and collection is often a major impediment. 
 
An alternative method is to approximate the monetary value of utility derived from 
electricity-dependent leisure activities. Becker (1965) was among the first who 
attempted to estimate the value of lost leisure time. This approach is founded on the 
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basic microeconomic theory that labour supply is the result of utility maximization of 
the households given the trade-off between leisure and income (or consumption if 
assuming all income is spent). Households supply their labour to other sectors of the 
economy and the time which is not spent on working or sleeping is referred to as 
leisure. Several studies have adopted this approach to quantify the value of lost leisure 
(see de Nooij et al., 2007; Wolf and Wenzel, 2014). Following this method, we estimate 
the value of leisure for the households and integrate this in our DIIM model as 
explained in the previous section. 
 
The value of leisure is estimated indirectly through the opportunity cost of leisure. For 
an employed person, the marginal benefit of (last unit of) leisure must equate to its 
opportunity cost in terms of foregone income from labour (Burkett, 2006). In the case of 
unemployed persons, we need to consider the possibility of involuntary unemployment 
or unemployment due to low compensation. This implies that opportunity cost of leisure 
for an unemployed person can be lower than that of an employed. In order to account 
for this, we assume that the value of leisure for an unemployed person is a percentage of 
that of an employed person. Furthermore, since all leisure activities are not electricity-
dependent, we adjust leisure times to reflect better the impact of power cuts. 
 
Therefore, we can calculate the value of leisure to the household (𝐶𝐿ℎ) as follows: 
                          𝐶𝐿ℎ = [𝛾(𝑇 − 𝑊ℎ)𝑊]𝑃𝑒 + [𝛾𝑇(𝜃𝑊)] (𝑃 − 𝑃𝑒)                (16) 
where 𝛾 is the percentage of electricity-dependent leisure activities, 𝑇 is the total time 
available to spend for work or leisure, 𝑊ℎ is total working hours, 𝑊 is average wage 
per hour, 𝜃 is a factor to adjust the opportunity cost of leisure for an unemployed 
person, 𝑃𝑒 is the population of employed people, and 𝑃 is the total population.  
 
In the absence of information on either the stated or revealed preference of households, 
this method approximates the utility gained from consuming electricity. However, as 
noted in Wolf and Wenzel (2014), the flexibility assumed in allocation of time between 
work and leisure can be unrealistic given that working hours are specified by contracts, 
and some people may not work full time. Furthermore, people may adapt if they 
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experience frequent power cuts. These factors are the shortcoming of this approach and 
cannot be fully accounted for using our adopted approach. 
 
4. Application to the Scottish economy 
 
4.1 Power interruption in Scotland 
Electricity in Scotland is delivered by two electricity distribution networks operators 
(DNO). Scottish Hydro Electric Power Distribution (SSEH) operates in North Scotland 
and serves around 740,768 customers (Ofgem, 2012). SP Distribution (SPD), part of the 
Scottish Power Group, supplies electricity to over 1,990,000 customers in Southern and 
Central Scotland (Ofgem, 2012).  
 
From a regulatory perspective, reliability of networks is crucial for a secure electricity 
supply. DNOs are expected to minimize outages in terms of frequency and restoration 
time. In order to incentivize the DNOs, the UK regulator (Ofgem) uses a penalty and 
reward scheme based on predefined performance targets. The main metrics are CI
9
 and 
CML which reflect frequency and duration of power outage respectively. CI is defined 
as the number of interrupted consumers (per 100 customers) whom their supply cut 
lasted more than three minutes during a year. CML is the average customer minutes lost 
per customer during each year for outage duration of in excess of three minutes.  
 
Figure 1 compares the CML (for unplanned outages) for the two Scottish DNOs with 
that of GB average over the period of 2003-10 inclusive. Figure 2 shows the CI for the 
same companies and the aforementioned period compared with GB average. Both 
figures indicate that over the past few years, Scotland has experienced power outages 
which are often higher in frequency and duration that of GB average. This is mainly 
because of weather related incidences which adversely affects the operation of the 
networks. Figure 3 shows frequency and duration of interruption for 2010-11. As can be 
seen from the figure, the majority of interruptions have been restored within 24 hours. 
This also implies sector resiliency as inoperability decreases over time. 
                                                          
9
 In order to distinguish CI as the metric for consumers’ interruption and CI an acronym of critical 
infrastructure we present the former in italic format. 
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Figure 1: CML for unplanned outages  
Source of data: Ofgem (2012) 
 
 
Figure 2: CI for unplanned outages  
Source of data: Ofgem (2012) 
 
 
Figure 3: Frequency and duration of interruptions (unplanned outages) for 2010-11  
Source of data: Ofgem (2012) 
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4.2 Scottish economy and data 
We explore the economic impact and interdependency effects of power supply 
disturbance through a case study of Scotland. Following the industrial revolution, 
Scotland became a leader in manufacturing industries. This has left a legacy in the 
diversity of its goods and services. However, over time as in the rest of the UK, there 
has been a decline in manufacturing and primary based extractive industries, while the 
service sector has been on the rise. Scotland has oil and gas resources in the North Sea 
and a large potential for renewable energy sources such as wind and wave, and is a net 
exporter of electricity.  
 
The economic activities of Scotland, as for any other modern economy, involve four 
types of primary activities: (a) production of goods and services by industries; (b) 
consumption of goods and services by industries and domestic final users (comprising 
mainly households and government, both local and central); (c) the accumulation of 
fixed capital and stock changes in the economy; and (d) trade which involves imports 
and exports to the rest of the UK and the rest of the world (Scottish Government, 
2011b). The measurements of these four activities are represented in an input–output 
framework. The input–output data provides a comprehensive picture of the flow of 
goods and services in the economy in a given year. The data also describes the 
interaction between the producers and consumers, together with the details of 
interdependencies among the industries.  
 
The data used in this study includes 101 industries in Scotland in 2009. The dataset 
contains the output of each industry as well as its reliance on other sectors, based on a 
Leontief coefficient matrix. The Leontief coefficient matrices are derived from the 
industry-by-industry matrix which shows how much of each industry’s output is 
needed, in terms of direct and indirect inputs, to produce one unit of a given industry’s 
output. Table A1 (Appendix) presents these industries which can be grouped under the 
following broad categories: 
 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 
 Mining,  
 Manufacturing,  
 Energy and water,  
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 Construction,  
 Distribution and catering,  
 Transport and communications, 
 Finance and business,  
 Public domain etc.,  
 Education, health, and social work, 
 Other services, 
 Households. 
The population of Scotland is slightly over 5 million; this number has remained stable 
in the past half century although recent immigration from the EU has supported a 
modest growth. Due to the general shift over the past 30 years from manufacturing to 
services, the service sector now accounts for around 75 per cent of the Scottish 
economy’s output and 82 per cent of the employment, whereas manufacturing is 13 per 
cent of the total output with 7.5 per cent of total employment (Scottish Government, 
2011a). According to the 2011 Annual Population Survey, around 73.6 per cent of the 
Scottish population were in full time employment (73.8 per cent in 2010 and 76.2 per 
cent in 2008) (Scottish Government, 2012). Furthermore, 8.3 per cent of the employed 
people were underemployed – in other words, searching for extra hours in their current 
job. Table 2 presents a summary statistics for the Scottish economy in 2009.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics – Scottish economy (2009) 
Population 5,194,000 
GDP (£m) 106,781.5 
Electricity sales (public supply) (GWh) 29,955 
Total domestic electricity consumption (GWh) 11,434.8270 
Commercial and industrial total sales (GWh) 15,631.8888 
Average domestic electricity consumption per capita (kWh) 2201.5454 
Population in employment  2,529,000 
Average hourly earnings (full-time employee)  £11.98/hour 
Sources: Scottish Government Input-Output Tables 2009; Scottish Government Energy 
Statistics Database (2014); Scottish Government Annual Population Survey (2009); Office for 
National Statistics (2014) 
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Leisure activities in Scotland are similar to those in the rest of the UK and are not 
entirely electricity-dependent. In order to evaluate the effect of power cuts on 
households we need to specify the percentage of leisure time which relies on electricity 
supply (parameter 𝛾 in equation 16). It is clear that 0 < 𝛾 < 1. Some studies have 
assumed that only half the leisure activities require electricity (see Growitsch et al., 
2013). Other studies assume this figure to be higher (e.g., 65 per cent in Wolf and 
Wenzel, 2014). According to the office for national statistics (ONS) (2011), in 2009/10, 
adult people aged 16 and above in the UK spent, on average, 3.5 hours a day watching 
TV, 2.5 hours using a computer, and one hour listening to the radio. If we consider 
other indoor and outdoor activities – such as holidays and day trips, sporting, social and 
political participation, shopping, eating out, cinema, and religious activities – we can 
observe that a large portion of mainstream leisure activities are electricity-dependent. 
There are of course activities that do not require electricity directly – such as reading in 
daylight or walking – however, these are often a small portion of the leisure time for 
most people. Therefore, following Wolf and Wenzel (2014) we assume that 𝛾 is 65 per 
cent. Furthermore, we assume that the opportunity cost of leisure for unemployed 
people is half that for the employed (de Nooij et al., 2007).  
 
4.3 Scenario generation and framework 
The scenario generation process involves specifying the initial inoperability vector (𝑞0), 
recovery time (𝑇), and final level of inoperability (𝑞𝑇). For example, we specify the 
initial inoperability as a shock to the electricity industry which disrupts 𝑞0 percentage of 
electricity supply (e.g., 5 per cent); this figure diminishes exponentially, with a final 
level of inoperability of 𝑞𝑇 (e.g., 0.001) achieved after 𝑇 period (e.g., 12 hours). The 
perturbation vector for all sectors can be obtained using the share of their output 
reliance on electricity as follows: 
                                                      𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞0
𝑢𝑖
max(𝑢𝑖)
                                            (17) 
where 𝑞𝑖 is the perturbation to sector 𝑖 as a result of 𝑞0 shock to the electricity industry 
and 𝑢𝑖 is the share of electricity in the output of industry 𝑖 divided by the share of 
electricity in the output of the maximum consuming sector. As electricity has the 
highest share in the output of the electricity industry itself, the relation in (17) results in 
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an inoperability of 𝑞0 in the electricity industry and a proportional inoperability for 
other industries based on their electricity usage. In the absence of data on the recovery 
process of each individual industry, we assume a similar recovery period, 𝑇, for all 
sectors as for the perturbed sector. This is because, as noted in Santos (2012), if a given 
sector is dependent on the perturbed sector it will follow the same recovery path as the 
initially perturbed sector. However, if a given sector does not rely upon the perturbed 
sector it will not be affected by the initial shock, irrespective of the recovery period 
chosen. The recovery period 𝑇 can be as short as few minutes or as long as days or 
weeks.  
 
A systemic analysis will be carried out by considering various sources of uncertainty – 
such as the degree of perturbation of the initially affected sector and temporal issues 
around sector recoveries. We compare inoperability with economic loss and identify the 
sectors most vulnerable to electricity supply disruptions in Scotland. Also, we will 
analyse the robustness of the ranking of vulnerable sectors to different durations and 
extents of power supply interruptions. Finally, we compute the cost of ‘energy not 
supplied’ in Scotland for different inoperability levels and periods of interruption.  
 
4.4 Results and discussion  
A power outage shock propagates rapidly and affects the whole economy through direct 
and indirect effects. These effects are more apparent in industries with higher levels of 
interdependency with the power sector. Figure 4 depicts the impact of power sector 
perturbation in terms of inoperability variation over the period of recovery. The figure 
presents a scenario where a shock is applied to the power sector with an initial 
inoperability level of 5 per cent which declines exponentially to 0.001 after 12 hours 
(720 minutes). In order to trace the effect of this inoperability shock we have selected 
six sectors, of which five are critical infrastructures, for illustration purpose. These 
sectors are: gas, water, telecommunication, financial service, coal industry and the 
household sectors in Scotland.  
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Figure 4: Inoperability change over the recovery period in selected sectors 
Source: Authors 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the affected sectors follow a similar recovery path but with 
different levels of inoperabilities over time. In all cases, inoperability initially increases 
until it reaches a maximum and then begins to decline. In the absence of resilience, 
inoperability will not decline, but will instead reach a new steady state. However, in 
practice, inoperability decreases because the perturbed sector (the power sector in this 
case) and other infrastructures are assumed to follow a recovery process (in other words, 
they are resilient). The inoperability following the electricity supply disruption can be 
the result of direct, indirect, and induced effects.  
 
A sector becomes inoperable in a scenario such as that outlined above if electricity is an 
important input in its production process. In the case of household lack of electricity 
disrupts the capacity for electricity-dependent leisure activities. Furthermore, as it is 
seen from the Figure 4, the resulting induced inoperability is relatively high (around 1.5 
percent at the beginning) due to sensitivity of the household activities to power cut. 
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Similarly, a sector can become inoperable if it supplies the inputs (such as gas or coal) 
of the electricity industry. This is because interruption in electricity services damages 
the business of the sectors that supply its inputs. Therefore, inoperability is not limited 
to the unidirectional effects of interrupted power as an input to other industries; it also 
embraces the sectors on which the electricity industry relies.  
 
For example, as seen from Figure 4, the inoperability of the coal industry progresses 
rapidly following an electricity disruption until it reaches slightly over 3 per cent (after 
approximately 40 minutes) and then the recovery starts. This means that the coal 
industry is highly affected, directly and indirectly, by the initial inoperability shock to 
the power sector. The main source of the inoperability impact on the coal sector, 
however, is that the Scottish electricity industry is highly dependent on coal. Thus, 
when an event interrupts the electricity industry it will also disrupt the coal sector. A 
similar situation holds for the gas distribution network, though with a lower peak 
inoperability.  
 
The marked reliance of the electricity sector on coal and gas can also be seen from 
Figure 5, which shows the share of electricity generation by fuel type in Scotland in 
2009. At the same time, both of these sectors consume electricity in their own 
production process- an example of the interdependencies among the industries within 
the energy sector. 
 
Although all the sectors follow a similar recovery path, the graphs in Figure 4 show a 
weaker inoperability for the water, financial services, and telecommunication industries. 
Also, their recovery takes slightly longer than that of the gas and coal industries. The 
lower inoperability in these sectors can be due to the lower level of interdependency 
between these industries and the power sector, as opposed to the case of coal and gas 
infrastructures. In other words, the greater the interdependency between the affected 
infrastructures and the initially perturbed sector, the higher will be their inoperability 
over the period of recovery. 
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Figure 5: The share of electricity generation by fuel in Scotland  
Source of data: Scottish Government Energy Statistics Database (2014) 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the top 10 sectors with the highest levels of inoperability during the 
recovery time. Figure 7 depicts the sectors incurring maximum economic loss over the 
aforementioned period. As can be seen from both figures, with the exception of the 
power sector (the initially perturbed industry) which has the highest rank in terms of 
both inoperability and economic loss, the remaining sectors do not hold the same 
ranking orders. For instance, the coal and lignite sector is ranked second for 
inoperability and the household sector is ranked forth (Figure 6), while they do not 
appear among the 10 most highly affected sectors in terms of economic loss (Figure 7). 
Conversely, the health sector appears to be highly affected financially (Figure 7) 
whereas it is not among the top 10 in terms of inoperability (Figure 6). A similar 
situation holds for other sectors. 
 
These results suggest that inoperability does not directly translate to a corresponding 
level of economic loss. In effect, the sensitivity of revenue and operational status to a 
particular input (e.g., electricity) varies across and within industries. This is due to the 
fact that operational responsiveness depends on occurrence of indirect effects, the 
importance of power as input in production, and flexibility of the production processes. 
On the other hand, economic responsiveness depends on the value of produced goods or 
services which have been disrupted as a result of inoperability shock.  
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Figure 6: Top 10 sectors with highest inoperability over the period of recovery 
Source: Authors 
 
 
Figure 7: Top 10 sectors with highest economic loss over the period of recovery 
Source: Authors 
 
These findings lead us to make a distinction between the operational responsiveness of a 
sector and its economic sensitivity to an input shock from the initially perturbed 
industry. The implication of this for critical assets is that prioritizing for the 
preservation of a sector during an extreme event should be based on some weighted 
 24 
 
average index that contains information about its operational status and economic loss, 
as well as its importance for the welfare and well-being of the population. A notable 
example is the household sector which becomes highly inoperable following power cut 
but the economic loss of the sector is not significant. However, due to societal 
implications, reducing the probability of outage in household sector has always been an 
important component of regulation for reliable services.  
 
The results in Figures 4, 6, and 7 are based on an arbitrary recovery period of 12 hours 
and an arbitrary shock with initial inoperability level of 𝑞0=0.05 for the electricity 
sector; and proportional for other sectors depending on their electricity usage. A valid 
query is whether the ranking of sectors based on inoperability and economic loss is 
sensitive to the chosen level of initial shock or recovery period. In order to investigate 
this, we analyse two cases with several underlying scenarios. In the first case, we 
assume different inoperability levels of 20, 40, and 80 per cent for the power sector, 
with a common level of recovery period of 12 hours. In the second situation, we 
investigate a common inoperability level of 15 per cent but different recovery periods of 
1, 3, and 6 hours. In all these cases, the power sector is assumed to become 99.999 per 
cent operable after the recovery period. The results of the above sensitivity analysis for 
inoperability and economic loss are shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.  
 
As Table 3 shows, there is no change in the ranking of the top ten sectors in terms of 
inoperability when different levels of shocks are assumed for the power sector (Case 1). 
This is also largely the case when different recovery periods are considered (Case 2), 
where some sectors shift one place up or down at some duration of recovery. Indeed, for 
three- and six-hour outage durations (second and third columns of Case 2) the ranking 
of sectors matches that in Case 1 except that the eighth sector is now ‘mining support’ 
rather than ‘other manufacturing’. For one hour of outage duration, the ranking of 
sectors is somewhat different, although it contains broadly the same sectors identified 
previously, except for ‘repair and maintenance’. Therefore, the top ten sectors, in terms 
of inoperability, are almost invariant with changes in the extent and duration of 
interruptions. 
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Table 3: Sensitivity analysis of inoperability (𝒒𝑻 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏) 
 Case 1  Case 2 
Top ten 
sectors 
𝑞0=0.20 
T=12 h 
𝑞0=0.40 
T=12 h 
𝑞0=0.80 
T=12 h 
 𝑞0=0.15 
T=1 h 
𝑞0=0.15 
T=3 h 
𝑞0=0.15 
T=6h 
1 SE45 SE45 SE45 SE45 SE45 SE45 
2 SE6 SE6 SE6 SE6 SE6 SE6 
3 SE46 SE46 SE46 SE101 SE46 SE46 
4 SE101 SE101 SE101 SE46 SE101 SE101 
5 SE38 SE38 SE38 SE8 SE38 SE38 
6 SE35 SE35 SE35 SE35 SE35 SE35 
7 SE39 SE39 SE39 SE38 SE39 SE39 
8 SE43 SE43 SE43 SE39 SE8 SE8 
9 SE3 SE3 SE3 SE3 SE3 SE3 
10 SE34 SE34 SE34 SE44 SE34 SE34 
 
SE45=Electricity, 
SE6=Coal & lignite,  
SE46=Gas etc.,  
SE35=Other metals & casting,  
SE38=Electrical equipment 
SE44=Repair & maintenance 
 
SE39=Machinery & equipment, 
SE3=Forestry harvesting,  
SE43= Other manufacturing, 
SE34= Iron & Steel, 
SE101=Households  
SE8= Mining Support 
 
A similar result can also be seen in Table 4 for the top ten sectors in terms of economic 
loss. Again some sectors shift one place up or down at some inoperability levels or 
recovery periods. However, these are the same previously identified top ten sectors in 
terms of financial loss (see Figure 7). The result of the sensitivity analysis offers 
confidence that the ranking of the different sectors in terms of their inoperability and 
economic loss is almost independent of the initial shock and recovery period assumed 
for analysis.  
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis of economic loss (𝒒𝑻 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏) 
 Case 1  Case 2 
Top ten 
sectors 
𝑞0=0.20 
T=12 h 
𝑞0=0.40 
T=12 h 
𝑞0=0.80 
T=12 h 
 𝑞0=0.15 
T=1 h 
𝑞0=0.15 
T=3 h 
𝑞0=0.15 
T=6 h 
1 SE45 SE45 SE45 SE45 SE45 SE45 
2 SE91 SE91 SE91 SE91 SE91 SE91 
3 SE89 SE89 SE89 SE89 SE89 SE89 
4 SE90 SE90 SE55 SE55 SE90 SE90 
5 SE55 SE55 SE90 SE8 SE54 SE54 
6 SE71 SE71 SE71 SE54 SE55 SE71 
7 SE50 SE50 SE50 SE90 SE50 SE50 
8 SE54 SE54 SE54 SE50 SE71 SE55 
9 SE52 SE52 SE52 SE71 SE52 SE52 
10 SE8 SE8 SE8 SE52 SE8 SE8 
 
SE45=Electricity, 
SE89=Public administration & defence,  
SE91=Health,  
SE55=Retail – excl. vehicles,  
SE54=Wholesale – excl. vehicles,   
 
SE8= Mining Support 
SE50=Construction – buildings, 
SE90=Education, 
SE52=Construction – specialized,  
SE71=Insurance & pensions,   
 
The inoperability and economic loss metrics provide a picture of the vulnerability of 
infrastructures following electricity supply disruptions, based on an ex ante analysis. 
This information is important in policy making, to enable risk management and 
investment to protect critical assets against extreme events. As the inoperability ranking 
order does not necessarily coincide with economic loss, an integrated form of these 
metrics is required to make a better reflection of the situation following a power cut. 
This analysis has been presented in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 provides the matrix of inoperability and economic loss impact for the top 10, 
20, and 30 sectors (horizontal axis – economic loss; vertical axis – inoperability). Any 
sector on the diagonal of this matrix is equally important from inoperability and 
economic loss perspectives. Those that are above the diagonal are affected more 
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financially while those that lie below the diagonal are affected more operationally. As 
shown in Figure 8, in each zone there are a few sectors that are vulnerable both from the 
operational and economic metric perspectives (although the top 10 zone only contains 
the electricity sector, implying that inoperability and economic loss follow a different 
ranking order in this zone). Other sectors such as: gas, wholesale, the coke, petroleum 
and petrochemical products, mining support, and fabricated metals are located in the top 
20 zone. Overall, the matrix identifies 14 sectors as vulnerable, when considering the 
integrated metrics of inoperability and economic loss based on an ex ante analysis.  
 
The ex ante analysis of infrastructure vulnerability to power loss is important for policy 
making; however, it does not replace the need for an ex post evaluation of vulnerable 
sectors. This is because some sectors may not appear in the ranking order presented in 
Figure 8, although their functioning is critical during a major outage. For instance, 
backup generators to support telecommunication systems during a major blackout are 
not normally deployed, and there is little economic incentive to deploy these costly 
arrangements (O’Reiley and Chu, 2008). However, for the purposes of crisis 
management, the perceived good of society, and in order to provide access to 
emergency services during a blackout, it may be desirable to supply such cross-
infrastructure backup. A similar situation holds for emergency services and water 
industry, among others.  
 
The above analysis shows the importance of reliable power supply given the 
interdependency among sectors and the consequent effects on the cost to society of 
energy not supplied. The societal cost of energy not supplied (SCENS) is among the 
important motives for investment in resiliency and reliability. In many countries, the 
regulatory framework of electric utilities is designed in such a way that SCENS affects 
their revenues directly or indirectly. Therefore, the utility companies have an incentive 
to minimize this cost by reducing the duration and frequency of interruptions, as well as 
the number of affected customers.  
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Figure 8: The matrix of inoperability and economic loss impacts  
Source: Authors 
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Figure 9 presents the societal cost of energy not supplied (SCENS); estimation of this is 
based on a range of different inoperability levels for the power sector and on a duration 
of interruption of up to 360 minutes (6 hours). The inoperability levels assumed are 5, 
20, 40, 80, and 100 per cent (blackout), and they decrease exponentially as explained 
and presented previously. The SCENS is estimated in terms of £/MWh of electrical 
energy interrupted, using total inoperability of the power sector over the period of 
recovery and the assumption of uniform electricity supply in each period if there was no 
interruption. Figure 9 shows that SCENS changes by only a trivial amount with the 
extent of interruption (different inoperability levels). For example, the graph shifts 
slightly upward when the level of inoperability increases from 5 percent towards 100 
per cent. Thus, we can conclude that SCENS is almost independent of the extent of 
interruption. This also coincides with intuition as we would expect to see SCENS 
varying only with duration of outages.  
 
 
Figure 9: Societal cost of energy not supplied (SCENS) for Scotland – 2009 prices 
Source: Authors 
 
As seen from Figure 9, in all scenarios SCENS starts from around £4,300/MWh for a 1 
minute interruption and increases with the increased duration of the power cut. The 
SCENS then rises rapidly to more than £7,000/MWh for a duration of around an hour, 
after which time its rate of increase slows. Also, the graphs show that regardless of the 
initial level of inoperability, all scenarios converge to around £8,000/MWh after two 
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and a half hours. That is to say, for service interruptions lasting for three hours and over, 
SCENS ranges from £7,865/MWh at 0.05 inoperability level to £8,100/MWh for a total 
blackout. 
 
Additionally, these results show that figures obtained using SCENS are significantly 
higher than those derived using traditional measures of societal cost of interruption 
(obtained by dividing GDP by total electricity sales in economy). Using the information 
in Table 2, we calculate this figure as £3,564.73/MWh. This is the average productivity 
of electricity for the Scottish economy and shows how much each megawatt-hour of 
electricity contributes towards GDP. With increased duration of interruption, this figure 
underestimates the societal cost of interruption to a greater extent. Furthermore, 
although the cost of energy not supplied depends on the structure of economies, and 
cross country comparisons may not be very accurate, our estimation of SCENS in 
Figure 9 is comparable with previous studies presented in Table 1.  
 
In summary, we have investigated the interdependency effects and the economic impact 
of electricity supply interruptions. The most vulnerable sectors to power outage, in 
terms of inoperability and economic loss, were identified. The results of the study 
showed that inoperability does not necessarily correspond to a similar level of economic 
loss and these two metrics can differ in the case of power supply shocks. The results 
also showed that the ranking of sectors in terms of vulnerability to power supply 
disruption is robust in relation to the extent and duration of interruptions. We also 
computed the societal cost of energy not supplied (SCENS) given the interdependency 
among the infrastructure sectors and showed that SCENS strictly depends on the 
duration of interruption. The findings also indicated that SCENS starts from moderate 
values for very short duration of interruptions before increasing rapidly. Beyond a 
certain duration of interruptions, the SCENS converges to a specific range irrespective 
of initial inoperability level. 
 
The results of this study provide some useful insights for policymakers and planners in 
their pursuit of improved electricity supply reliability and reductions in the economic 
impact of possible power outages. First, at sector level the regulatory incentives to 
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reduce power interruptions need to justify investment in resiliency enhancement and 
quality of supply improvement. An estimation of the societal cost of power outage, 
which also takes into account the interdependency effects, can be used to calculate 
societal ‘willingness to invest’ in power quality, given the probability of outage. 
Overestimation or underestimation of the societal cost of power outage could lead to 
overinvestment or underinvestment, respectively, in power quality and security of 
electricity supply.  
 
Second, at economy level, measures to protect critical assets need to be based on cost–
benefit and risk analysis. There is always a trade-off between improving the resiliency 
of the power sector versus that of vulnerable infrastructures. An accurate analysis which 
compares the costs and benefits of resiliency improvements to the power sector with 
those of vulnerable sectors leads us towards an economically optimum level of 
reliability. Also, such analysis sheds light on the effectiveness of the available risk 
management measures such as reducing interdependency among critical infrastructures, 
increasing preparedness, and enabling smart response to major power cuts.  
 
Third, the results highlight the need for an integrated security indicator which reflects 
several aspects of industry and business under extreme events. Such aspects would 
include: inoperability, economic loss, and the degree of importance of the sector for the 
welfare and well-being of the population. There is also a need for the development of 
relevant indices which measure the risk of different sources of failure, in addition to 
sector resilience and reliability. Theses indices could support managers and operators of 
critical infrastructures with tools enabling them to analyse and manage the risk 
holistically.  
 
Finally, the results of this study provide useful insights for the management of outages 
and optimal operation of the power system. The ranking of vulnerable sectors based 
upon the ex ante analysis can help decision-makers address the issue of forced outage 
under extreme events in an economically informed way. Having developed indices that 
have sector level information about cost per MWh together with criticality of service for 
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welfare and wellbeing, planners can avoid random outages in favour of commencing 
power rationing in the sectors at lower economic costs and inoperability levels.  
 
Despite the appealing characteristics of the DIIM model, it has some limitations. First, 
an important assumption of the model is that the level of economic interdependency 
remains the same as the level of physical interdependency, and thus two sectors with 
high economic interdependency also have high physical interdependency (Haimes et al., 
2005a). To the extent that economic interdependencies are obtained from multiplication 
of real physical interdependency and ‘undistorted producers’ prices’ this can be 
reasonable. This means that having an undistorted electricity price across an economy is 
crucial for this model, as this is a basic assumption of input–output tables. In the 
absence of real physical data (given that collecting such information is costly) on the 
interaction of sectors, the use of economic interdependency can be the second-best 
option for evaluating physical interdependency effects (Haimes et al., 2005a).  
 
However, there are situations which may lead to underestimation or overestimation of 
the economic costs of power outage when using the DIIM approach. If the price of 
electricity is subsidised, or taxed differently in some sectors than others, this may lead 
to a distortion of outage costs, because it directly affects the strength of interdependency 
among them. Furthermore, there are some forms of losses which normally are not 
valued by DIIM and should be included separately, as in this paper. For example, the 
cost of lost leisure resulting from a power cut is not normally accounted for in input–
output models; such costs should thus be evaluated separately. Additionally, DIIM may 
not calculate the restart cost of industries following interruption of production lines. 
Another form of loss which is not captured by this model is that caused by stock 
damage – for instance to items such as perishable goods and ticket sales (Théron and 
Bologna, 2013).  
 
The second limitation is that the DIIM model strictly relies on the assumption of a 
Leontief coefficient matrix (A), hence all the limitations and assumptions in 
construction of this matrix apply to DIIM as well. Finally, the inoperability input–
output model assumes an equilibrium condition in its static form (Haimes et al., 2005a). 
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This implies that the industries’ inputs and outputs are in equilibrium with the final 
consumption. This assumption is true for the long-run analysis but can be violated after 
an inoperability shock and during the recovery period, if the initial inoperability level is 
assumed to be very high. In this situation, the recovery process does not reflect the 
actual behaviour of an economy under extreme events. However, if the initial 
inoperability shock is a fraction of total output (in other words, less than 100 per cent) 
then the results of the DIIM model are more reliable. This is because a partial 
inoperability within a large economy can be dealt with by redirection of resources from 
other parts of the economy during the recovery period. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The power sector is an industry on which many other infrastructures rely heavily. 
Hence, security of electricity supply has always been high on the agenda of policy 
makers and sector regulators. At the same time, many infrastructure sectors are 
interdependent and a failure in electricity supply will result in cascading effects, with 
consequences for the societal cost of energy not supplied (SCENS).  
 
Therefore, it is imperative to understand the intricate interdependencies between the 
power sector and other infrastructures, together with the impact on other interdependent 
sectors when the electricity supply is perturbed. This study has analysed the 
interdependency effects and economic impact of electricity supply disruption using a 
DIIM model. We then applied the model to a case study of 101 sectors of the Scottish 
economy in 2009.  
 
Our analysis demonstrated that inoperability can be different from economic loss and 
that highly inoperable industries in the short run (after shock) are not necessarily the 
same as those most affected economically. This is because the sensitivity of revenue and 
operational status to a particular input (for example, power) might vary for a given 
sector and across different sectors. The results also indicated that ranking of the affected 
sectors in terms of inoperability and economic loss metrics are robust with respect to 
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extent and duration of interruptions. Based on an ex ante analysis and relevant data one 
can develop indices which has both information about economic cost (£/MWh) and 
criticality of service for society. This helps decision makers to prioritize vulnerable 
sectors for resource allocation and resiliency enhancement against major power outage 
incidences. It also helps to manage forced outages in an economically informed way by 
avoiding random outages. 
 
We also estimated SCENS taking interdependencies among sectors of the economy into 
consideration. The results show that SCENS ranges from about £4300/MWh for 1 
minute of interruption to a maximum figure of around £8100/MWh for an outage of 
three hours and more. Additionally, SCENS increases very marginally with the extent 
of power blackout (inoperability). The social cost of interruptions based on direct, 
indirect, and induced effects due to interdependency can be used to calculate ‘societal 
willing to invest’ in resiliency enhancement based on probability of power outages. 
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Table A1: Industries of Scottish Economy used in Analysis (2009) 
ID Sector name ID Sector name ID Sector name 
SE1 Agriculture SE35 Other metals & casting SE69 Information services 
SE2 Forestry planting SE36 Fabricated metal SE70 Financial services 
SE3 Forestry harvesting SE37 Computers, electronics & opticals SE71 Insurance & pensions 
SE4 Fishing SE38 Electrical equipment SE72 Auxiliary financial services 
SE5 Aquaculture SE39 Machinery & equipment SE73 Real estate – own 
SE6 Coal & lignite SE40 Motor Vehicles SE74 Real estate – fee or contract 
SE7 Other mining SE41 Other transport equipment SE75 Legal activities 
SE8 Mining Support SE42 Furniture SE76 Accounting & tax services 
SE9 Meat processing SE43 Other manufacturing SE77 
Head office & consulting 
services 
SE10 Fish & fruit processing SE44 Repair & maintenance SE78 Architectural services etc. 
SE11 
Dairy products, oils & fats 
processing 
SE45 Electricity SE79 Research & development 
SE12 Grain milling & starch SE46 Gas etc. SE80 Advertising & market research 
SE13 Bakery & farinaceous SE47 Water and sewerage SE81 Other professional services 
SE14 Other food SE48 Waste SE82 Veterinary services 
SE15 Animal feeds SE49 
Remediation & waste 
management 
SE83 Rental and leasing services 
SE16 Spirits & wines SE50 Construction – buildings SE84 Employment services 
SE17 Beer & malt SE51 Construction – civil engineering SE85 Travel & related services 
SE18 Soft Drinks SE52 Construction – specialized SE86 Security & investigation 
SE19 Textiles SE53 Wholesale & Retail – vehicles SE87 Building & landscape services 
SE20 Wearing apparel SE54 Wholesale – excl. vehicles SE88 Business support services 
SE21 Leather goods SE55 Retail – excl. vehicles SE89 
Public administration & 
defence 
SE22 Wood and wood products SE56 Rail transport SE90 Education 
SE23 Paper & paper products SE57 Other land transport SE91 Health 
SE24 Printing and recording SE58 Water transport SE92 Residential care 
SE25 
Coke, petroleum & 
petrochemicals 
SE59 Air transport SE93 Social work 
SE26 
Paints, varnishes and inks 
etc. 
SE60 Support services for transport SE94 Creative services 
SE27 
Cleaning & toilet 
preparations 
SE61 Post & courier SE95 Cultural services 
SE28 Other chemicals SE62 Accommodation SE96 Gambling 
SE29 
Inorganic chemicals, 
dyestuffs & agrochemicals 
SE63 Food & beverage services SE97 Sports & recreation 
SE30 Pharmaceuticals SE64 Publishing services SE98 Membership organizations 
SE31 Rubber & Plastic SE65 Film video & TV etc. SE99 
Repairs – personal and 
household 
SE32 Cement lime & plaster SE66 Broadcasting SE100 Other personal services 
SE33 Glass, clay & stone etc. SE67 Telecommunications SE101 Households 
SE34 Iron & Steel SE68 Computer services   
 
